Immanence and individuation by Brown, D. J.
IMMANENCE AND INDIVIDUATION: 
BRENTANO AND THE SCHOLASTICS 
ON KNOWLEDGE OF SINGULARS 
/. Introduction 
When Brentano introduces the notion of immanent objectivity or the 
intentional inexistence of objects in Psychology from an Empirical Stand-
point, he cites Scholastic theories of intentionality and suggests that his 
own view is continuous with medieval and ancient theories of objective 
being.1 Very few philosophers of the middle ages used the terminology of 
esse objectivuum and those that did, such as Peter Aureol, do not appear 
to be among the primary Scholastic sources for Brentano's theory of 
immanence.2 To a modern ear moreover talk of things existing in the mind 
objectively is confusing. But the contrast which is important for under-
standing Brentano's theory of intentionality is not that between objectivity 
and subjectivity as commonly understood nowadays, as if having something 
objectively in mind excluded its being a subjective phenomenon, but some-
thing like Descartes's opposition between that which objectively exists 
(i.e., is present in the mind or to consciousness as an object) and that 
which formally exists (i.e., is a mode or substance). Hence for Descartes, 
whose characterization of immanent objectivity Brentano often cited ap-
provingly in his lectures,3 any two thoughts, for example, a thought about 
God and a thought about a horse, will have exactly the same formal reality 
(as modes of the mind) but may differ enormously in their degree of 
objective being (in the kinds of being they represent).4 
What Brentano does however inherit from the Scholastics is the 
general idea that the character of a thought needs to be explicated by 
reference to what the thought is about where what the thought is about is 
regarded in abstraction from the conditions of actual existence. Hence, 
the theory of immanence is often described as a doctrine committed to at 
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least two kinds of being—being in the mind or being in a spiritual mode 
and being outside the mind or being in a material mode. From this very 
division of being are generated the kinds of problems that have exercised 
both Brentano and his commentators. Such questions as have been treated 
include: What is the status of intentional objects? Are they things? Does 
the theory of immanence entail the existence of Meinongian objects? If 
from something's being an object of thought it follows that it has being, 
are there such things as round squares which simply of necessity lack 
existence? If the primary objects of thought are intentional objects, does 
it follow that any epistemology based upon the theory of immanence must 
be a form of representational realism?5 These are important questions but 
they are not the focus of this paper although what I have to say bears in-
directly upon them. 
Let us return to the idea for a moment that what is central to the 
theory of immanence as it is used in Brentano's medieval and ancient 
sources (chiefly, Aristotle and Aquinas6) is that the objects of thought are 
acquired through a process of abstraction. The principle effect of abstrac-
tion was generally thought by medieval Aristotelians to be that what the 
mind acquires is a general concept or universal. In other words, what one 
abstracts from are precisely the conditions which individuate an object 
and what one is left with is an idea which no longer is adequate to 
represent a particular in a completely determinate fashion. The question 
then arises: how is it possible to know objects as singulars? What Brentano 
thus inherits from the Scholastics, along with the theory of immanence, is 
the problem of individuation. 
But how does it happen that despite the fact that intuitive thought is so thor-
oughly universal, we can still very firmly maintain that everything which is 
must be individual.. . ?7 
How indeed? 
The primary aim of this paper is to explain the connection between 
the theory of immanence in its medieval and Brentanian forms and the 
problem of individuation. The predominant Scholastic solution to the 
problem will be compared with Brentano's own "Leibnizian" account of 
singular knowledge. I shall begin in the next section with a discussion of 
how the problem arose in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the 
middle ages for it is in this metaphysico-epistemological tradition that 
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Brentano's work is best located. In Section III, I outline Brentano's theory 
of immanence in more detail and discuss his proposed analysis of singular 
knowledge. I shall argue that there can be found in Brentano's later mod-
ifications of the theory of immanent objects nominalist tendencies which 
should have made the task of explaining singular knowledge easier. 
Brentano's general rejection of nominalism and the residual Aristotelian-
Thomistic ideas in his theory of intentionality, however, prevented a full 
swing to nominalism. In the fourth Section I consider one medieval nom-
inalist solution to the problem of singular knowledge, William of Ockham's, 
in the light of Brentano's objections to nominalism. It is my contention 
that not only does Brentano's reading of medieval nominalism contain a 
fundamental misunderstanding, but that his own philosophy of mind 
requires the possibility of direct, non-abstractive epistemic access to indi-
viduals. Thus in the final Section I discuss how an adequate theory of the 
unity of consciousness requires an adequate account of our knowledge of 
singulars. 
//. The Problem of Individuation 
and Aquinas on Singular Knowledge 
"The problem of individuation" is actually a gloss for two problems: 
one metaphysical; the other epistemological. Although it is the latter in 
which I am interested, the two problems are to some extent inseparable. 
Puzzles about individuation arose in the Middle Ages from a popular 
reading of Aristotle's doctrine of universal hylomorphism. For on one 
reading of Aristotle, every material being or ensouled body is a composite 
of matter and form. Forms can be more or less specific (compare animality 
and humanity) and are the active principles of beings. They explain what 
makes a thing the kind of thing it is. Prime matter is pure potentiality and 
must be actualized by form in order to exist. Within this picture there are 
no individual essences or forms. Socrates has the same substantial form as 
Plato.8 So if one asks what differentiates Socrates from Plato, the answer 
cannot appeal to a difference in form. 
This is not the only way to read Aristotle. On some readings the 
identity of individual forms is not presupposed.9 But it does seem to be the 
reading which generated the problem of individuation in the Middle 
Ages.10 The orthodox response among many medieval Aristotelians, in 
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particular those influenced by Aquinas, was to hold that matter is the in-
dividuating principle. There is some textual support for their reading of 
Aristotle in Aristotle's texts. For example, at Metaphysics, V, 1016 b 31-3, 
Aristotle writes; 
Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, 
others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those 
whose formula is one.. . . n 
Intuitively, matter would seem to be as poor an individuator as form since 
matter too is shared by all hylomorphic entities. The doctrine of individu-
ation by matter was refined by the time of Aquinas' De ente et essentia to 
mean not that matter per se but "designated matter" or "that which is con-
sidered under determined dimensions" is the individuating principle.12 
This should not be taken to imply that for Aquinas things are individuat-
ed by their particular spatiotemporal location. Any particular dimensions 
are accidents and things are not individuated by their accidents.13 Desig-
nated matter can't be described; it can at most be pointed at. Socrates has 
this matter; Plato that. That is all that can be said of the difference between 
them. 
The idea that matter individuates came under criticism later in the 
medieval period particularly in the work of Duns Scotus and William of 
Ockham. Scotus, for example, argued that, being a passive principle, 
matter cannot individuate objects. Nor is the quantity (being itself a 
formal notion) of matter an individual has necessarily unique to it.14 But 
for Ockham, as we shall see below, the epistemological problems were as 
acute as the metaphysical ones. 
Matter was not for either Aristotle or Scholastics like Aquinas 
something of which the intellect could have direct knowledge.15 Indeed, it 
is a good question how we come to have an idea of matter at all. Brentano 
also seems to have thought of the abstraction involved in the acquisition 
of intentional objects as abstraction from matter. In a footnote to the dis-
cussion of the intentional inexistence of objects in the Psychology, 
Brentano describes Aristotle as endorsing the idea insofar as he held that 
sense contains the sensed object and the intellect, the thing thought, minus 
its matter.16 The important point for our purposes is that it follows from 
this that things individuated by matter can only be thought about in 
universal terms. Partly in order to account for our knowledge of univer-
26 DEBORAH BROWN 
sals, Aquinas had argued that the intellect understands by abstracting 
universal forms (intelligible species) from their individuating material 
conditions.17 The process of acquiring knowledge begins with the senses 
which receive the forms of things through the medium. These forms are 
already abstracted from their material conditions in individual extramen-
tal objects and exist in a spiritual mode in the medium (air). The received 
forms come to have new individuating material conditions in the material 
sense organs including the imagination which stores these sensible species 
as phantasms. The agent intellect must perform another abstraction to 
bring these species before the mind so that they may stand for or signify 
not just the particular extramental cause but for any extramental thing 
with the same substantial form. The intellect does not conceive of indi-
vidual things as individuals in this process.18 
It must be said that our intellect cannot know directly and primarily the 
singular in material things. The reason for this is that the principle of singu-
larity in material things is individual matter; but our intellect, as was said 
above, understands by abstracting an intelligible species from matter of this 
kind. That which is abstracted however from individual matter is universal. 
Whence our intellect understands directly only the universal.19 
What would it be to "know the singular in material things"? And how 
does that differ from knowing the individual through universals? I 
propose that we think of the distinction in terms of whether or not a par-
ticular act of knowledge is ontologically dependent upon a particular 
individual for its being the very thought that it is. Even if a general 
thought about the nature of equinity is caused by the presence of a partic-
ular horse, Brunellus, it is clear that the very same thought could have 
existed had any other horse been the triggering cause. But a singular 
thought about Brunellus is dependent upon the identity of Brunellus. It is 
this notion of dependency which is captured in the contemporary idea that 
singular propositions are literally constituted in part by the individuals 
referred to in them. I am not here endorsing this conception of singular 
propositions. But whatever conception of singular propositions one 
accepts, it is fair to say that for Aquinas the intellect cannot be in direct 
relationship with individuals in the way required to formulate singular 
propositions. 
How then does Aquinas propose to solve the epistemological puzzle 
of singular knowledge? Since we cannot know individuals through the 
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concept of matter, the fact that things are individuated by matter is of no 
help in solving this problem. Yet Aquinas had to be as keen as anyone else 
in the history of philosophy to establish the possibility of singular 
knowledge. For he was a metaphysical nominalist who held that outside 
die mind only individuals exist. He was also explicitly what we would call 
a direct realist. Even though speculative knowledge is always universal, it 
should not be taken to be about species rather than extramental individu-
als.20 "Species intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur, sed id quo intelligit 
intellectus."21 Individual material objects are thus the first and proper 
objects of knowledge. The ability to cognitively individuate objects was 
also regarded as crucial in practical reasoning, the cornerstone of both 
Aristotelian and Thomistic ethics.22 
In response to the epistemological problem of individuation Aquinas 
argued that the intellect indirectly understands singulars. Singular 
knowledge occurs when the intellect "reverts" to the phantasms (conver-
tendo se adphantasmata) through a process of reflection.23 In De Veritate, 
I, q.2, 6, Aquinas introduces an interesting analogy with mirror images to 
clarify this point. A mirror image is a likeness of the particular thing being 
mirrored just as the phantasm is a likeness of the individual upon which it 
is causally dependent. 
[T]he likeness (similitudo) which is perceptible in sense is abstracted from 
the thing as from a knowable object (cognoscibili) and, therefore, through 
that likeness the thing itself per se is known directly. The likeness which is 
in the intellect however is not abstracted from the phantasm as from a 
knowable object but as from a medium of cognition, in the manner in which 
our senses perceive the likeness of a thing in a mirror; as long as they are 
directed (fertur) toward it (the likeness) not as if toward a certain thing but 
as toward a likeness of a thing. . . . 24 
We can attend to a mirror image of a human and say "this is a human" 
and in doing so we are not referring to the mirror image but to the indi-
vidual mirrored. Nonetheless, we would still be thinking of the individual 
under the sortal "human." Similarly, Aquinas claims that by attending to 
the phantasm itself we can be said to know the singular of which the 
phantasm is a particular likeness. 
To what extent, however, does the doctrine of reverting to phantasms 
or sensory presentations establish intellectual knowledge of singulars? At 
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 86, 1, Aquinas writes; 
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Indirectly, however, and through a certain sort of reflection (the intellect) is 
able to know the singular: because, as was said above, even after it has ab-
stracted intelligible species, accordingly, it is unable to understand them 
(singulars) by an act unless it turns itself towards the phantasms in which, as 
is said, it understands intelligible species. In mis way, therefore, (the 
intellect) understands the universal itself directly through an intelligible 
species; it understands singulars however indirectly, of which there are 
phantasms. And in this manner the intellect forms this proposition: 'Socrates 
is human.' [my emphasis]25 
Does Aquinas here establish that the intellect can, after all, entertain 
singular propositions? I think not. The sentence 'Socrates is human' 
should not, if Aquinas is to remain consistent, be understood to be ex-
pressing a singular proposition in the contemporary sense. 'Socrates' in 
this sentence more than likely serves as an abbreviation for a general de-
scriptive concept. As Norman Kretzmann has argued, Aquinas' point 
seems to be that whereas the intellect contemplates the object through uni-
versals, the sensory context fixes which individual is being understood. 
Thus we are entitled to think of the soul as a whole as formulating the 
proposition 'Socrates is human.'26 This interpretation is supported by 
passages such as that at De Veritate I, q.2, 6 where Aquinas denies that any 
particular cognitive faculty knows singulars. 
For properly speaking neither sense nor intellect knows, rather the human 
being knows through each of the two. . . . 27 
This account of singular knowledge enjoyed a long and relatively un-
challenged position in medieval philosophy. Even vehement critics of 
Aquinas's epistemology such as Henry of Ghent accepted the basic idea 
that the intellect was concerned with universals and the sense with 
singulars.28 But it is far from obvious that Aquinas succeeded in estab-
lishing intellectual knowledge of singulars. At most he seems entitled to 
claim that there is sensory representation of singulars. One can see how 
the intellect might be said to know indirectly singulars if it were able to 
form some singular proposition about either the object itself or the 
phantasm itself. If I am grasping a cup and think "This thing causing my 
sensation is warm" or "Whatever is causing this sensation is warm" then 
I am thinking about individuals. But in both these cases my thought and 
not merely my senses take an individual as object. If I can only think 
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"Whatever is causing a sensation of warmness here and now is warm," I 
have not succeeded in identifying in thought any individual. 
Finally, the claim that the human being as a whole has intellectual 
knowledge of singulars, although intriguing, needs further defense. 
Aquinas asks us to accept that the whole soul has singular knowledge 
even though no faculty is capable of formulating anything like a singular 
proposition and when it is not clear how the faculties are integrated. So we 
should perhaps be wary of concluding that the Thomistic solution to the 
problem of individuation is an adequate one. And yet the idea that the 
sensory context fixes which individual is being thought about has 
persisted to this day most obviously in the revival of causal theories of 
reference.29 Interestingly, it was this aspect of Thomistic accounts of 
singular knowledge which was adamantly rejected by Brentano. 
///: Brentano on Universal and Singular Knowledge 
I have already mentioned how Brentano's Aristotelian commitments 
to the form/matter distinction and to the abstractionist theory of 
immanence place him in a similar position as Aquinas with respect to the 
problem of individuation. Brentano was also a metaphysical nominalist 
and direct realist.30 Thus he too had reasons to offer some solution to the 
problem of individuation. There are three aspects of Brentano's mature 
epistemology which are relevant to the topic of singular knowledge. His 
official solution (the "Leibnizian" move which I discuss towards the end 
of this section) is not, to my mind, either all that interesting or likely to 
hold water. But the reasons why this was in effect his only option—his al-
ternative account of abstraction and his rejection of intuitionist accounts 
of singular knowledge—are interesting and important to understanding 
his theory of intentionality generally. 
If intentional or immanent objects are universals, as Brentano seems 
to think, one might well begin by asking why they don't correspond to 
common or universal natures and accidents. Are not universals things 
which in the mind have one kind of universality (abstracted from matter) 
and in the world have another kind of universal being (enmattered)? Not 
according to Brentano at least in his later writings. It was not only the 
worries with standard Meinongian examples (round squares, Pegasus, 
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etc.) but a concern for the ontological status of abstracta (redness, size, 
justice, humanity, etc.) which led Brentano to modify his account of in-
tentional objects.31 
The key to understanding the notion of intentional inexistence as 
developed in the later works rests with understanding Brentano's claim 
that words used to designate the objects of thought are not "autoseman-
tic."32 Objects of thought are not distinct from the acts of thinking. Names 
designating objects of thought belong in the category of synsemantic or, 
to use a medieval expression, syncategorematic terms, a category tradi-
tionally reserved for the logical constants of a language (e.g., truth-functional 
and non-truth-functional connectives, quantifiers and articles). Sentences 
of the form 'I am thinking of Pegasus' are meaningful (and hence have a 
truth-value) but not because all of the nominative expressions have referents. 
A name like 'Pegasus' should not be treated as a name of an ens rationis. 
[Although whenever a word is used it is related to a meaning, there are still 
differences in the way this comes about, since many words can be used by 
themselves, but some can only be used in conjunction with other words, and 
are so designated as merely synsemantic (mitbedeutende) words.33 
The same point applies to universals. Brentano's "concession to nominal-
ism" was to regard universals not as things but as "delusions" or "fictions 
of speech" which should be taken to describe the incomplete way in which 
the mind is thinking about objects.34 When we talk of universals as objects 
of thought we are, thus, not naming objects in anything like the way we 
name real objects. In reality we are thinking only in modo recto of 
someone thinking and of the thing thought in modo obliquo. Brentano 
draws on an analogy with qualities. Size, redness, thinking or shape do not 
exist by themselves nor can they be thought of by themselves. If these 
were really distinct from the object with the size, colour and shape, then 
they should be able to exist independently of those objects. Similarly, if 
the object of thought were really distinct from the thinker, it too should be 
capable of independent existence. But that, Brentano claims, is absurd.35 
The size or shape of an object is not something over and above or added 
to an object nor is it a part of an object. To think of the size of something 
is to think of the thing as having a certain size. Similarly, to think of an 
object of thought is to think of someone (oneself, for example) having a 
certain thought. 
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[W]hen we affirm something as thought-of, the truth of the matter is that we 
are really doing nothing but acknowledging someone thinking of it.36 
The way in which Brentano's theory of intentionality developed thus 
led to a striking difference between his approach and the Scholastic 
account he earlier took himself to be modelling. For Aquinas, intentional 
beings are the forms themselves and universal concepts are autosemantic; 
they do not merely describe the thinker but have an independent being. 
Indeed, they exist independently of particular thinkers as forms in the 
medium. What is curious is why Brentano did not take his "concession to 
nominalism" on this issue further. By treating universals as synsemantic, 
he can be seen to have effectively freed himself from the Thomistic idea 
that there needs to be some kind of identity (formal for Aquinas) between 
intentional objects and the extramental objects from which these inten-
tiones are abstracted. This could have allowed Brentano to regard at least 
some ideas as ideas of individuals. But Brentano remained steadfastly 
committed to the generality-of-thought hypothesis. 
What prevented Brentano from moving further in the direction of 
nominalism? I submit that there were two key factors in Brentano's epis-
temology which made nominalism unpalatable to him. The first was his 
conviction that no representation by virtue of its intrinsic properties can 
be said to be necessarily of one individual rather than another. In terms 
expressed earlier, no representation depends on the existence of a partic-
ular thing for its being the representation it is, although as we shall see a 
representation for Brentano may accidentally be adequate to just one 
thing. The second and related point is that Brentano never seems to have 
relinquished the idea that thought is essentially an abstractive process and 
hence cannot yield ideas of singulars. Let us examine each of these points 
in more detail, beginning with the second. 
An important difference between Brentano and medieval Scholastics 
like Aquinas is that abstraction is not, according to Brentano, a progres-
sion from a sensory presentation or intuition of an individual to a more 
general concept.37 Sensory presentations of objects from which ideas are 
abstracted are themselves also general forms of consciousness. Mental 
phenomena do not at any level present the singularity of a thing.38 This 
aspect of Brentano's theory also distances his view from Kant's. 
According to the so-called "containment theory of predication," abstrac-
32 DEBORAH BROWN 
tion is a matter of extracting general ideas which are contained in sensory 
intuition. Brentano denied this on the grounds that the forms abstracted 
are rarely if ever present in the intuition.39 For example, we abstract the 
idea of a triangle through perceiving drawn figures none of which are 
strictly speaking triangles.40 
What then is the process by which the mind acquires knowledge of 
universals? Brentano's answer amounted to a rethinking of the psycho-
logical processes involved in abstraction. Abstraction, he argued, relies on 
our capacity to notice differences and make comparisons between things, 
to detect the "continual approximating of an extreme" among objects and 
to draw "multiple inferences," for example, when we abstract ideas about 
the positions of points in a line from our concept of a straight line.41 Ab-
straction involves thinking of "something relative"; for example, the 
comparison between a number of red things is necessary for the formation 
of the concept of redness.42 Through the process of abstraction we are thus 
able to form a general concept indifferent to individual differences. We 
also acquire the "disposition" to think of a universal in the absence of an 
appropriate particular and without performing the operations of compari-
son, etc., which were involved in the construction of the disposition.43 
But if we must make comparisons, notice differences, etc., in order to 
form a general idea, just what are we supposed to be comparing? How is 
it possible to engage in the mental act of comparing objects without rep-
resenting those objects under sortal concepts? Since, for Brentano, all 
thought is universal, it would seem that the very processes of comparison 
require us already to have universal concepts. Prima facie it would be 
easier to understand how the mind abstracts general concepts by comparing 
individual presentations. But if these presentations are themselves already 
general forms of consciousness, the role played by abstraction Brentano 
describes cannot be that which explains the formation of all our concepts, 
though it might explain the formation of some, for example, higher-order 
universals (genera) like colour and shape or relations between universals 
such as humans are more like asses than stones. 
Let us now turn to Brentano's reasons for adopting this strong stance 
against presentations, sensory or otherwise, of individuals. To restate the 
historical reasons, Brentano's position derives in part from his Scholastic 
reading of Aristotelian metaphysics. He notes that we do not have a pre-
sentation of "the individual determination of a substance" which also 
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individualizes the accidents and thus we are forced to think of everything 
in universal terms.44 However Brentano also offers a very interesting 
argument against the idea that the senses yield us knowledge of singulars. 
The reason given is that: 
[W]e can, without contradiction, imagine that another being has the very 
same determination as the being that we perceive. Thus someone else could 
have the same visual presentations, the same sensory judgements and sensory 
affects. So these things do not constitute the individuality of that which we 
inwardly perceive.45 
Let us see how this objection works in the context of Aquinas's 
account of singular knowledge. It is true that Aquinas says little about the 
mechanics of reverting to the phantasms and, as we have seen, much 
hangs for Aquinas on the claim that the phantasm is a likeness {similitu-
de) of just one thing. If this is the right way to read Aquinas, the analysis 
of singular knowledge will surely fail. For what explains singular 
reference cannot be the mere likeness between the phantasm and object. 
As Brentano notes, similarity is ubiquitous. If a mirror image or visual 
presentation is a likeness of Fred, it is as much a likeness of Ned, his 
identical twin, and two people can have the same kind of visual presenta-
tion and be thinking about distinct objects. Worse still for Aquinas, 
similarity between phantasms and extramental objects cannot ground our 
sensory knowledge of singulars because similarity is itself understood in 
terms of the identity of forms. It is because the phantasm has the same 
form as the object sensed that it is a likeness of it. But forms are universal 
and hence the phantasm cannot be the likeness of just one thing. 
Now one might object at this point that forms, as they exist in 
phantasms, are not universal since they exist in the matter of the sense 
organs. But this does not help Aquinas's case because if the form of the 
phantasm is individualized and so bears no intrinsic relation to the form 
of the extramental object it is harder still to see why it should represent 
that and only that object. For Brentano's objection to hold however it has 
to be established that the resemblance between a phantasm and an object 
is being proposed in this kind of theory as a sufficient condition for the 
phantasm's being a representation of that particular individual. Aquinas's 
texts neither confirm nor disconfirm this claim. Nonetheless, it is easy to 
see how the theory might be modified to avoid Brentano's criticism. All 
one need do is assert that for the phantasm to represent just one thing it 
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must both resemble that thing and be caused by it. The price paid here is 
that one is forced to regard the causal relation between the phantasm and 
its object as a necessary rather than contingent relation. But one could 
argue that this is an acceptable cost (which many today are prepared to 
pay) to establish the ontological dependency of a representation upon an 
individual. If one reads Aquinas as asserting both these conditions as 
necessary for singular reference, then one will not accept Brentano's 
claim (above) that "someone else could have the same visual presenta-
tions. . . . " about individuals other than those one is visually representing. 
For it would follow that a phantasm could not have a different cause and 
be the same phantasm. 
Of course, once one begins to admit a causal criterion for mental rep-
resentation the need for a representation to resemble what it represents 
becomes less obvious. Contemporary causal theories of reference, for ex-
ample, do not require that a representation instantiate any of the qualities 
of the object. In order to represent an individual it is thus not necessary to 
perform any formal abstraction since one is not necessarily re-presenting 
any property of the object by which to represent it. We shall return to this 
point below when we address Brentano's relationship to the nominalist 
tradition. 
Let us turn now to Brentano's own account of singular knowledge. 
Knowledge of individuals does not, he argues, involve immanent singular 
objects—such an idea is incoherent for him for the reasons just given— 
rather, individuals are conceptualized in thoroughly universal terms. 
Brentano thus developed a Leibnizian model of individual concepts in 
which conceiving of an individual is nothing more than "synthesizing" a 
complex idea from ideas of the individual's properties. A representation of 
an individual on Leibniz's (mature) theory can be understood as a 
maximally consistent set of universals.46 An "individual" object of 
thought for Brentano is thus nothing more than a "complete" object of 
thought in the sense that for every property expressed by a universal, P, 
the object either has P or not-P. To have ideas of distinct individuals the 
difference between their properties must be present to consciousness. 
The answer is that the concept of there being two beings implies that we do 
not mean by the one what we mean by the other. Only in this way would 
there be one thing and another. To be sure, they must both have in common 
the property of being a "thing" and they may have other properties in 
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common as well, but when one is thought of in terms of an exhausitive def-
inition, it must be presented in some way that the other is not.... In view of 
the above, it is not difficult to see how we can think of an individual thing in 
an unintuitive way, however, even though we are incapable of thinking intu-
itively of it.47 
Brentano appears to be betting on the impossibility of completely in-
discernible individuals. As bets go, the odds are not in Brentano's favour. 
Whilst most philosophers accept one side of Leibniz's Law, namely, the 
indiscernibility of identicals, few are willing to accept the converse, the 
identity of indiscernibles. Philosophers in the Middle Ages also divided 
on this metaphysical issue and different metaphysical commitments gave 
rise to different epistemological accounts. Those who thought that there 
could be objects indiscernible in both essence and accidents tended to 
reject the view that individuals could be known entirely under general 
aspects. Scotus, for example, argued that there could be individual differ-
ences which are not differences of form and as such are not detectable by 
us. God could make two indiscernible whitenesses occupying the same 
region of visual space but each with a distinct thisness (haecceitas) or in-
dividual difference (differentia individualis). The sun's rays, Scotus thought, 
present us with a real example of indiscernible individuals.48 
Scotus and, subsequently, Ockham represent a tradition in medieval 
thought which denied that individuals can be reduced to compounds of 
universals. While Scotus remained a realist about common or universal 
nature (natura communis), Ockham developed a rigorous nominalism 
according to which nothing is universal. Both views, however, acknowl-
edged the distinction between general and individual concepts and a 
theoretical space opened in which it was thought possible to have direct 
knowledge of individuals unmediated by universals. In the next section I 
shall outline Brentano's objections to this alternative approach to singular 
knowledge. 
IV: Brentano and Ockham on Nominalism 
and Knowledge of Singulars 
Brentano dictated his last letter on March 9th, 1917, eight days 
before his death. In this letter he mentions the "Medieval Nominalists" 
and scorns their denial of universals one last time. One could say that the 
nominalist threat was something Brentano would fight to the death. The 
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depth of what Brentano knew of medieval nominalism is difficult to 
establish with certainty but we can at least establish the breadth. 
Brentano's contribution to Moehler's (1867) Kirchengeschichte, a chapter 
on the history of the ecclesiastical sciences he composed using notes of 
Moehler's while he was still a Catholic priest and young professor at the 
German University of Wiirzburg, the subsequent Die Vier Phasen der 
Philosophies where Brentano outlines further his theory that the 
evolution of philosophy is marked by transitions between four repetitive 
phases, and his lecture notes from between 1867 and 187050 are perhaps 
our best sources for investigating what Brentano knew about medieval 
nominalism. The lectures, which appear to have been based in part on the 
chapter from Moehler, provide an overview of nominalism from Roscelin 
and Abelard in the twelfth century, through Aureol and the Dominican, 
Durandus Saint-Porcain in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century 
to William of Champeaux and Ockham in the fourteenth century.51 
Brentano was apprised also of modern accounts of nominalism, especial-
ly Berkeley's. And we might speculate that Brentano's identifying the 
nominalisms of the Middle Ages with those of the moderns contributed to 
his making a fundamental though not uncommon mistake about the 
medieval nominalists. 
The error is summed up in one line from Brentano's last letter: 
The existence of general ideas is denied not only by the Medieval Nominal-
ists, but by famous modern philosophers as well, Berkeley in particular.52 
There are two ways of understanding the notion of a general idea. If we 
take a general idea to be an idea of some thing which is universal in 
nature, as the realist does, then a medieval nominalist will not accept the 
existence of general ideas. But there is another way to construe the notion 
of a general idea and that is as an idea which stands for or signifies or rep-
resents more than one thing. In this respect, a nominalist can perfectly 
well accept the existence of general ideas. 
Berkeley was not sensitive to this distinction in part because his own 
theory of ideas as images ruled out the second interpretation. Thus in his 
criticism of Locke on abstracta, Berkeley takes himself to be denying the 
existence of general ideas. He asks, sceptically, in The Principles of 
Human Knowledge: 
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What more easy [sic] than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, 
and there try whether he has . . . an idea that shall correspond with the de-
scription . . . of the general idea of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor 
rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all or none of these at 
once"?53 
But without the assumption that a general idea must be an image of all the 
things which fall under it, this objection does not hold. In any event, if 
Berkeley were representative of nominalism generally, then Brentano's 
criticisms of nominalism would be devastating. For as Brentano points 
out, "without general ideas, it would not be possible to have general 
judgements or demonstrative proofs."54 This was an objection familiar to 
medieval nominalists. It was generally thought that to have the status of 
scientific propositions, definitions by genus and differentiae must have 
universal application. A second objection advanced by Brentano accused 
the nominalists of being unable to distinguish between equivocity and 
generality. If we can only cognitively represent individuals, then any 
general term is simply ambiguous and ambiguity precludes the possibili-
ty of scientific generalizations. 
The [nominalist] beliefs that we cannot think of universals, and that so-called 
general terms are only associated with a multitude of individual presenta-
tions have also been refuted. This would make them equivocal terms and a 
single proof for a truth expressed in general terms would be impossible.55 
But Berkeley is not representative and medieval nominalists did not 
deny the existence of general ideas in the second sense referred to above. 
Brentano's criticisms can thus be easily defused. Indeed, Ockham antici-
pated both of Brentano's objections and offered the following responses. 
First, the denial of universals in nature did not, according to Ockham, 
signify an end to science or its reliance on definition and demonstration. 
Every science, real or rational (e.g., logic), is primarily concerned not 
with universal nature, which does not exist, but with universal proposi-
tions. To say 'Humans are rational animals' is to define the term 'human'. 
Science is not however concerned merely with language but with the 
truth-makers for universal propositions. The proposition 'Humans are 
rational animals' is true if and only if each and every individual which the 
term 'human' signifies (and supposits for in the proposition) is an indi-
vidual which the definiens 'rational animal' signifies (and supposits for in 
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the proposition). For the proposition to be true no appeal need be made to 
common natures but no denial of general ideas is required either.56 
In response to the second objection, Ockham denied the existence of 
ambiguous concepts.51 Ambiguity is possible in spoken or written language 
but an ambiguous name must be subordinated (Ockham's term for the 
asymmetric semantic dependency of a conventional term on a concept) to 
distinct concepts. For example, the name 'bank' is ambiguous because it 
can be used on different occasions to express different concepts (e.g., the 
concept of a financial institution or the concept of the side of a river). 
Proper names in spoken and written language like 'Socrates' may also be 
ambiguous. By contrast, a general name like 'human' is subordinated to 
just one concept and hence is unambiguous. None of this prevents the 
concept from signifying indifferently all individual humans.58 There is 
thus nothing in the doctrine of nominalism which collapses the distinction 
between general and ambiguous terms. 
Brentano's criticisms of nominalism do, however, have more bite 
against those versions of nominalism which remained attached to the theory 
of immanent objects. In this camp we can include Berkeley—since there 
is no being not even a being of thought which is a triangle but neither 
equilateral, scalenon, etc., there can be no general idea of triangularity— 
but also an early theory of Ockham's which Brentano seems to have had 
in mind in his comments on Ockham's nominalism.59 Although initially 
attracted to the idea of immanent objects, the so-called "fictum" theory, 
Ockham went on to reject formal identity between intramental and extra-
mental objects as basic to either semantics or epistemology.60 The later 
intellectio theory defines thoughts as mental acts which do not represent 
the world through the mediation of intentional objects. This shift combined 
with the hypothesis that there is a mental language provided the founda-
tions for Ockham's nominalism. Concepts, in the strictest sense, are terms 
and just as there can be general terms in spoken or written language so too 
there can be general terms in mental language. 
In the medieval nominalist tradition individuals were thus pushed 
into prominence as the primary objects of thought. Everything, substances 
and qualities, was thought of as individual. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the problem of singular knowledge did not present itself. Following 
Scotus, Ockham developed an empiricism in which our first cognitive ex-
periences of the world are intuitive cognitions of individuals. An intuitive 
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cognition is a cognition in which an individual is known to exist and 
which signifies that individual alone. General concepts are arrived at by 
abstraction (in abstractive cognitions) from intuitive cognitions. Abstrac-
tion, for Ockham, is therefore a process of moving from singular to general 
knowledge. 
It is not as some say that these (abstractive) concepts preexist the intuitive 
notion of a human being, rather this is the process. First a human is appre-
hended (cognoscitur) by some particular sense, then that same human is 
apprehended by the intellect and when (the human being) has been 
conceived, a general notion common to all humans is formed. This appre-
hension (cognitio) is called a concept, intention or passion which is a 
common concept for all humans and when it exists in the intellect, the 
intellect immediately knows that a human is something without any process 
of reasoning (sine discursu). Then, another animal having been distinguished 
from a human or from another animal, one general notion is elicited for every 
animal, and that general notion for every animal is called a passion or 
intention of the soul or the common concept for every animal.61 
The same process applies in the case of qualities. A cognizer first 
acquires a concept for Socrates's particular paleness and a concept for 
Plato's particular paleness and then abstracts the general concept of 
paleness. Notice that since, contrary to Brentano, it is not assumed that we 
begin with a general representation of an individual, there is no need to 
suppose that at this stage any sortal concepts are required. Indeed, for 
Ockham, abstractive cognitions presuppose the intuitive cognitions of 
singulars; not vice versa.62 
It might seem that until we can determine whether or not concepts in 
the intellectio theory are imagistic we cannot assume that Ockham 
succeeded in meeting the kinds of objections Brentano raises. Saying that 
a concept is a term does not rule out resemblance as a necessary condition 
for signification. But I suspect that, at least in Ockham's later intellectio 
theory, it was causation rather than resemblance which was thought to 
ground representation. This claim is supported by an important passage in 
which Ockham imagines how we would settle what one was thinking 
about when one's cognition of a singular is as similar to one as to the other 
of an indiscernible pair. There he claims the following: 
I say . . . that an intuitive cognition is proper to a singular, not on account of 
a greater likeness (assimilationem) to one than to another, but because it is 
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naturally caused by one and not by the other, and cannot be caused by the 
other.63 
Notice that an intuitive cognition caused by a singular cannot be 
caused by any other singular and still be the same idea. This satisfies our 
earlier requirement that singular knowledge involves some kind of de-
pendency on the identity of the individual which gives rise to it. General 
knowledge does not. Indeed from this we can infer that what makes 
something a general idea is that it can be caused by any individual of the 
same kind. 
V: Conclusion 
Brentano was right, historically, to point out that the medieval nom-
inalists never eclipsed Thomism as the dominant way of thinking about 
these issues.64 Why, for example, Ockham's epistemology did not foster a 
long tradition or influence the phenomenological movement in the way 
that theories based on the notion of immanent objectivity did is a fasci-
nating historical question. Why the assumption that thought is essentially 
general is still so popular today, even among those (e.g., Quine) who are 
committed to nominalism as a metaphysical doctrine, is also a mystery. 
There are of course contrary trends. Recent work on indexical knowledge 
and proper names has demonstrated the difficulty of trying to eliminate 
singular terms from thought and language.651 would like to conclude by 
pointing out how an adequate theory of singular knowledge is also 
important to the study of the mind. 
As Brentano argued in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 
experience shows us that we are often mentally directed towards the same 
individual object, for example, when we think of or have a presentation of 
an object and desire or love it at the same time.66 The unity of conscious-
ness in turn presupposes that we are able to identify a continuous self (the 
T of experience) as the subject of experience. 
The unity of consciousness, as we know with evidence through inner per-
ception, consists in the fact that all mental phenomena which occur within us 
simultaneously . . . all belong to one unitary reality only if they are inwardly 
perceived as existing together. They constitute phenomenal parts of a mental 
phenomenon, the elements of which are neither distinct things nor parts of 
distinct things but belong to a real unity.67 
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It appears crucial to Brentano's account of the unity of consciousness that 
there be a single, unified subject of inner perception, something which 
directly apprehends its own mental phenomena and which Brentano links 
with the notion of a "self." It is conceivable that more than one self can 
inhabit the same body but what would distinguish these as distinct centres 
of consciousness is nothing but their restricted access to their own mental 
phenomena.68 But we may well ask: Where does the idea of this individ-
ual self come from and how does it come to be identifiably my self? 
Described in general terms a self no more belongs to me than to anyone 
else with the same kinds of acts of consciousness and introspective 
capacity. Even if one were possessed of a Leibnizian complete idea of a 
self which happened to describe oneself and only oneself—that is, if one 
existed objectively in one's own mind—one would not necessarily 
thereby know oneself unless one knew that such an idea were an idea of 
one's own self. But in that case one must have some other way of knowing 
oneself than via a completely general idea. It is thus not surprising that 
Brentano's Scholastic mentors should struggle with the phenomenon of 
individual self-knowledge. The account of concepts as abstract universals 
is not amenable to the idea of a singular conception of the self and one 
cannot rely on a sensory intuition of the self in order to explain self-
knowledge.69 
To conclude, despite the influence Brentano's immanentist philoso-
phy has had on contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind, the 
problems associated with singular knowledge should be a sufficient 
reason for rethinking the need for immanent objects in the theory of in-
tentionality.70 
Deborah Brown 
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